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INTRODUCTION
Another trade dispute was initiated in 2001 involving parties in the
United States against the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB). This trade dis-
pute was initiated by concerns raised by the North Dakota Wheat Commis-
sion, and represented through their council and experts. Compared to pre-
vious trade disputes, this one differs in that it focused on trade practices
both within North America and in third countries and it included both hard
red spring (HRS) and durum wheat. Ultimately these concerns were deemed
legitimate by the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), and the Spe-
cial Trade Representative (STR) concurred. Most important was that an
affirmative decision was reached in the early stages of the action, as well
as a determination that the CWB acts as an arm of the Government of
Canada.
The case has been resolved (as of early 2002) and the Trade Rep-
resentative is now seeking appropriate remedies.  Not all the papers and
evidence from the case are available and the resolution process is cur-
rently proceeding. These factors affect the scope of this paper. The pur-
pose of this paper is to describe the evolution and findings of the case. In376 Keeping the Borders Open
the next section we describe the evolution and findings of previous related
cases. Then, we identify the details of the Section 301 case and present the
major claims and responses by the parties. We provide the results of the
ITC investigation and the interpretation of the Trade Representative. In the
last section, we discuss the likely next steps and issues that economists and
policy analysts may consider in future deliberations.
EVOLUTION OF TRADE DISPUTES
The trade practices of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) have been
a long-standing area of contention between the United States and Canada.
Several investigations and negotiations have been conducted concerning
the behavior of the CWB and its impacts on U.S. farmers since 1989. These
investigations/negotiations  have been undertaken under different auspices,
which remain a point of contention within the WTO. The range includes
the Canada/United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA); the U.S. Inter-
national Trade Commission (ITC), Sections 22 and 332; General Account-
ing Office (GAO); North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA);
Canada/United States Joint Commission on Grains; and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce,. Investigations have focused primarily on trade in durum
wheat and within North America. These are summarized by Schmitz and
Furtan in Table 1.
The issues between Canada and the United States were first ad-
dressed during the period 1989–2000 within the Canada/United States Free
Trade Agreement (CUSTA). Under CUSTA, concerns over pricing, Cana-
dian transportation subsidies, market access and import restrictions for wheat
were addressed. Under this agreement, both sides agreed that neither country
could sell agricultural products at a price below the “acquisition price” of
goods plus storage, handling and other costs. CUSTA did not define the
acquisition price so it failed to resolve concerns of the United States.
The United States requested a dispute resolution panel under
CUSTA in 1992 to address their belief that Canada was selling exports at
below acquisition costs. The panel in this dispute ruled in favor of Canada
and defined the acquisition price in Canada as the initial price paid to377
farmers. Canadian sales into the U.S. market were again brought up in the
negotiations for NAFTA. However, under NAFTA, the same commitments
and definition of acquisition price contained in CUSTA were maintained
despite appeals from U.S. wheat farmers for changes.
Table 1: Canada/United States Grain Border Disputes.
Investigation Conducted by Completed Outcomes
Durum: conditions U.S. ITC, under 1990 CWB deemed clean.
of competition Section 332 of the No evidence of price cutting
Tariff Act of 1930 by CWB in U.S. market
Review of CWB U.S. GAO 1992 No evidence of unfair
and Australian trade practices
Wheat Board
CUSTA Bi-National Panel 1993 Ruled in favor of Canada.
under CUSTA Received 3.5 year audit of
durum sales.
Wheat and U.S. ITC, under 1994 1994/1995 cap on exports
products: Section 22 of the to the US precluding more
harm to U.S. Agricultural severe trade restrictions
farm programs? Adjustment
Act of 1930
Canada/U.S. grain Joint Commission 1995 Many recommendations
market and policy on Grains were made to improve trade
environment in both directions.
Ability of state U.S. GAO 1996 Acknowledged that there
trading enterprises was no evidence that the
to distort trade CWB was violating existing
trade agreements.
U.S. agricultural U.S. GAO 1998 No solid conclusions, but
trade; Canadian focused on areas of U.S.
 wheat issues concern
Countervailing U.S. Department of 1999 Final ruling confirmed that
duty on live cattle Commerce the CWB did not provide a
from Canada subsidy to cattle producers
alleging CWB April 1997 to July 1998.
results in
barley subsidy.
Sources: CWB and Schmitz and Furtan (2002)
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The ITC has conducted several investigations into conditions of
competition between the United States and Canada. In 1990, the ITC in-
vestigated the durum wheat market from 1986 to 1989 and found no sig-
nificant difference in prices paid by U.S. processors for Canadian or simi-
lar quality U.S. durum. In 1992, the ITC within Section 22, was asked to
examine if imports of wheat, flour or semolina affected wheat support
programs. Since Canada is the largest exporter to the United States for
wheat, the ITC focused its analysis on Canada and found that Canadian
imports were interfering with U.S. wheat. This was resolved with a Memo-
randum of Understanding negotiated between the United States and Canada
which implemented tariff rate quotas on Canadian imports to the United
States for one year.
The GAO investigated issues involving the ongoing dispute be-
tween the United States and Canada over wheat on several occasions, fo-
cusing on several specific issues. In 1992, the GAO confirmed that the
CWB had received payments from the Canadian government for shortfalls
in their pool account in 1990 and 1991. In 1995, the GAO examined the
CWB as a state trading enterprise (STE) in the context of GATT and the
WTO. In 1996, the GAO again examined STEs including the CWB. They
found that the CWB benefitted from government subsidies covering occa-
sional operational deficits, monopoly over domestic consumption and ex-
port markets, and pricing flexibility obtained through delayed producer
payments. In 1998, the GAO again examined Canadian wheat imports into
the United States with regard to STE activities of the CWB. They reiterated
that the CWB is an STE, but indicated that available information was insuf-
ficient to determine whether the CWB was operating within existing laws.
In all cases, the CWB’s response to these investigations has been to
claim vindication as a fair trader. The CWB repeatedly states that it has
withstood the eight trade challenges initiated by the United States since
1989.379
THE SECTION 301 CASE
In October 2000 the U.S. Trade Representative, at the request of
the North Dakota Wheat Commission, initiated an investigation under Sec-
tion 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 examining the wheat marketing prac-
tices of the CWB. This case differs from prior cases in that it extends the
areas of competition examined beyond direct comparisons within the North
American market to offshore markets and includes the Hard Red Spring
(HRS) wheat market as well as the durum wheat market.   In the first sub-
sections below, we summarize the claims, counter-claims and interpreta-
tions by the parties and government agencies.  This is done without cri-
tique.  Then, in the following section we provide our economic interpreta-
tion of the claims and interpretations.
U.S. Claims
The United States advanced several claims against the CWB in this
action. It was argued that the CWB had special privileges and protections
by virtue of its relationship with government that gave the CWB unfair
advantages that could not be replicated or would incur additional costs/
risks if implemented by commercial firms in the United States. Specifi-
cally, it was argued the CWB, as a government monopoly, has six benefits:
• government borrowing for operations and export credit exten-
sions at reduced rates;
• government-guaranteed initial payment to producers;
• price pooling;
• lack of price transparency;
• preferential transportation legislation and regulations; and
• non-tariff import barriers.
In addition, the CWB benefits due to its supply monopoly, which allows it
to enter into long-term contracts risk free. Due to the supply monopoly, the
CWB can call supplies at any time without regard for prices or market
signals. Extension of longer-term commercial contracts would incur higher
costs/risks that would have to be accounted for. Finally, it was argued that
the CWB has no mandate to maximize producer profits; that its only man-
date is to avoid the undue accumulation of Canadian wheat stocks.
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As evidence, the North Dakota Wheat Commission (NDWC) indi-
cated an eight-percent price advantage on CWB offers in third country
markets. The NDWC indicates that traders in third countries report a long-
standing pattern of the CWB offering wheat at average selling prices five
percent under U.S. bids. In addition, the practices of over-delivery of pro-
tein and over-cleaning of Canadian wheat amounts to an additional advan-
tage of two percent and one percent, respectively. Further, the NDSWC
indicates other transportation (rail) benefits.
The NDWC proposed five changes to induce more competitive
practices:
• elimination of the CWB supply and export monopolies;
• definition of CWB “acquisition costs” under CUSTA must be
changed to include all payments to producers;
• full transparency of CWB operations including acquisition costs,
export pricing and other sales information unique to single desk
exporters;
• national treatment (i.e., treating US and Canadian wheat simi-
larly in each others’s market system)  for any U.S. wheat enter-
ing Canada including full and equal access to Canada’s market-
ing and transportation system; and
• tariff rate quotas on imports of Canadian durum wheat ($50/ton
for imports exceeding 300,000 tons) and non-durum wheat ($50/
ton for imports exceeding 500,000 tons) into the United States.
Responses by the CWB
The responses by the CWB to the complaint and the requests of the
ITC were generally limited, non-forthcoming and predictable.  Most of
their arguments are contained in the paper by Sumner and Boltuck (2001)
summarized below.
Sumner and Boltuck evaluated the arguments in the Section 301
case for wheat for the CWB. Their responses were in three areas: the struc-
ture of the global wheat market, price discrimination, and the CWB as a
farmer co-operative in procurement. They also commented on certain as-381
pects of competition and trade between the United States and Canada.
Their major conclusion is that the complaints leveled against the CWB
were a simplistic view of cause and effect with regard to U.S./Canadian
wheat trade. They included four specific arguments:
• the analysis does not take into account the world global market,
national producers, and competing exporters;
• the focus on sales to eight specific countries ignores the losses in
market share that are offset by gains in other markets;
• the analysis ignores the performance of competing exporters;
• the analysis does not consider that the efforts of the CWB may
actually increase U.S. exports.
Further, Sumner and Boltuck indicated four aspects of the struc-
ture of the global wheat market that must be considered when analyzing
competition between Canada and the United States:
• while the United States and Canada are large exporters (Canada
is the third largest exporter), they are not the largest producers of
wheat;
• the United States is a special case in that it exports wheat, yet it
also imports wheat from other countries to supplement different
class/quality needs;
• U.S./Canadian wheat trade is affected geographically; produc-
tion areas in Canada are closer to demand sources in the United
States than some U.S. production. In turn, U.S. production areas
are closer to export locations than U.S. demand areas; and
• marketing performance of U.S. farmers is affected by actions of
multinational traders who contract with importers and can source
from multiple origins (Canada, the United States, and other coun-
tries).
In response to these arguments, the experts for the U.S. case indi-
cated that Canada incorrectly combined the durum market and the wheat
market in its presentation. The U.S. experts argued that durum does not
have close substitutes and should be evaluated separately. If durum is ex-
amined separately, Canada is the second largest producer, behind the Eu-
ropean Union and accounts for 59 percent of world durum exports. These
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large market shares suggest that the CWB may be able to exercise unilat-
eral market power in the world durum market.
The NDWC said that the CWB practices price discrimination (as
has Kraft Furtan and Tyrchniewicz, Schmitz and the Canadian Wheat
Board).  Sumner and Boltuck argue that NDWC allegation of predatory
pricing as related to price discrimination is simply not credible because the
CWB could not expect to recover profits lost by engaging in predatory
pricing. They claim that the price discrimination present in international
markets is classic third degree discrimination (Phlips).  Further, the ability
to price discriminate is limited by the integration of importing markets into
the global market; the prevalence of alternative sources of wheat including
domestic and international supplies; the contestability of the market by
potential entrants; downstream competition in flour, semolina and pasta;
and the competition among wheat classes. Finally, the presence of third
degree price discrimination may not necessarily be harmful to U.S. pro-
ducers and may in fact benefit them. The prime example of this benefit is
the CWB restricting exports to the United States.
In response, the U.S. experts argued that Sumner and Boltuck indi-
cated the CWB would have no incentive to engage in predatory pricing
because they would not be able to recover profits lost. The U.S. experts
argue this would have some relevance if the CWB’s overriding objective
were to maximize profits for Canadian farmers. However, they argue the
CWB has neither a statutory requirement nor actual incentive to maximize
profits. Further, they argue that Sumner and Boltuck later indicate the ob-
jective of the CWB is to maximize revenues. The U.S. experts argue that
maximizing revenues from the sales of wheat bought from Canadian farm-
ers is not consistent with maximizing profits for Canadian farmers.
The NDWC argued that the CWB has a government monopsony
for supply. Sumner and Boltuck indicate that while not technically the
same, the CWB operates much like U.S. co-operatives.  In addition, the
CWB cannot have a monopsony in procurement because it does not retain
profits.383
Sumner and Boltuck indicated that while the CWB is more suc-
cessful in forward sales than U.S. firms, U.S. firms are free to conduct
business that way. They also argued that the Board success in offering
long-term contracts is primarily due to scale of sales and not due to a
supply monopsony.
In response the U.S. experts indicated that while the CWB cannot
earn monopsony profits from Canadian farmers, it can benefit from run-
ning up excessive administration costs at the expense of Canadian farm-
ers. Further, the CWB can enter into long-term contracts because it faces
no market determined acquisition risks as the  Canadian Wheat Board Act
provides for jail sentences for farmers who attempt to market wheat to
anyone other than the CWB. U.S. grain firms have no such assured supply
and would need to purchase futures contracts to reduce risks to acceptable
levels. The CWB does not have to hedge long-term contracts because the
Canadian farmers (collectively through the pools) bear the risks of unex-
pected price changes.
ITC Interpretation
The ITC examined aspects of competition between Canada and
the United States and made statements on nine dimensions.
The ITC indicated four structural differences between the Cana-
dian and U.S. durum markets:
• Canada’s durum production is three times larger than in the United
States, and the U.S. durum market is more heavily dominated by
Canada than the HRS market;
• there are no close substitutes for durum wheat, unlike the HRS
wheat market where HRS and Hard Red Winter (HRW) typically
compete for the same products;
• the market for durum is dominated by a few large sellers and a
few large buyers.  This domination has resulted in durum price
discovery being more opaque due to limited observed trades and
the demise of the Minneapolis Grain Exchange durum futures
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contract.  The demise of the MGE durum contract has been at-
tributed to the presence of the CWB.
• Canada can forward contract durum sales while the United States
typically sells on the spot transactions. The ITC argues that be-
cause the few trades occur for durum futures and cash sales are
spotty and thin, the process of price discovery is more opaque.
Thus, the CWB can make forward sales which no U.S. firm could
due to the high level of risk and price volatility facing traders in
a thinly traded market.
The ITC also identified several structural differences between the
United States and Canada in ordinary wheat. First, The CWB has both
monopsony and monopoly powers in marketing of western Canadian
wheat. Also, the ITC claimed the CWB has several deductions applied to
prices paid to farmers which they control and dictate (cleaning, transporta-
tion, handling charges). These deductions have been argued to be phan-
tom charges which can be manipulated to Canada’s advantage when pric-
ing. The NDWC indicates that charges are deducted from all producer
deliveries and that these do not reflect actual costs for all shipments. The
excess can be used either to increase final payments to producers or to
lower bids to the United States. The CWB disputes these allegations.
The ITC found three significant differences between the CWB and
producers co-operatives:
• the CWB has financial security from government and backing of
its borrowing and lending;
• all western wheat producers must use the CWB to market, how-
ever producer participation in a co-operative is voluntary. Thus,
the CWB has no “free riders’ adding to Canadian supply, nor
under-cutting the CWB’s pricing structure.
• the CWB does not have to accept all saleable western wheat of-
fered to it (but it is contractually obliged to request delivery of
100% of the amount it does accept), whereas a cooperative does.
This control gives the CWB power over quantities as well as
prices.385
The ITC surveyed market participants for terms and conditions of
pricing in the United States. Respondents indicated that many purchases
of Canadian wheat are quoted and contracted relative to U.S. prices, often
using the Minneapolis HRS prices. Prices for U.S. grain typically included
premiums and discounts for grade factors not meeting specifications while
Canadian sales contained only premiums for grade differences. The ITC
indicated that the premium for No. 1 over No. 2 CWRS was three cents per
bushel which is consistent with U.S. price differentials for grades. Other
differences in pricing centered around delivery terms, where Canadian
sales were more likely to be forward sales than spot sales and  were more
likely to have longer delivery terms.
The ITC also examined the issue of over-delivery of protein for
U.S. and Canadian sales in the U.S. market by surveying market partici-
pants. They found that 65 percent of U.S. HRS and durum shipments ex-
amined were over-delivered on protein, while 54 percent of the Canadian
contracts were over-delivered on protein. Most of the over-deliveries were
small with all deliveries within 1.5 percent of the protein level specified in
the contract. None of the respondents indicated adjustments in price due to
over-delivery on protein. However, the ITC’s analysis indicated that when
a delivery exceeded the contract protein specification, the delivered price
exceeded the contract price in about one fifth of the reported purchase
contracts.
The ITC examined prices of U.S. and Canadian wheat. Direct com-
parison of contracted and delivered prices were not possible due to differ-
ences in reporting contract terms (grade, protein, timing, and other fac-
tors). Two analyses were conducted. The first examined contracted (largely
gateway) prices for comparable wheats (No. 1 CWAD and No. 1 HAD;
No. 1CWRS and No. 1 HRS; and No. 2 CWRS and No. 2 HRS). The
second analysis examined delivered prices, basis Minneapolis. Results in-
dicated that prices basis  Minneapolis for CWAD were higher than HAD
for all months except one over the period 1996/1997 to 2000/2001. Com-
parisons for No. 1 CWRS versus HRS were mixed. Some CWB prices
were higher and some lower than U.S. prices. For No. 2 CWRS, prices at
Minneapolis were generally higher than No. 2 HRS.
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The ITC sought to examine market practices and prices for exports
from Canada and the U.S. to selected countries. Issues examined included
quality differences including overdelivery on specifications and export
price comparisons. Foreign and U.S. buyers indicated that Canada was
more likely to over-deliver on quality than U.S. shippers. Most over-deliv-
ery for protein was within 0.2 percent. However, Canada was more likely
to over-deliver in excess of 0.8 percent higher than specifications versus
exports from the United States. Prices were often not adjusted for over-
delivering on protein.
The Commission asked survey respondents for information on
monthly export prices for HRS/CWRS and HAD/CWAD for the eight ex-
porting countries examined. Direct comparisons of export prices were lim-
ited due to non-response and the unavailability of prices. Some countries
bought only from either Canada or from the United States so prices were
available from only one of the exporters. Others received exports directly
through the CWB where no price data  were supplied. Direct comparisons
were made for the Venezuelan market (a market served by CWB accred-
ited exporters). They indicated that prices for No. 2 HAD and No. 2 CWAD
offered to importers in Venezuela generally moved in the same pattern.
Otherwise, the ability to verify claims about price discrimination and mar-
keting were extremely limited.
There are several important features of rail transportation that are
important for wheat trade between Canada and the United States. Canada
has regulated rates (now regulated for  maximum revenue) to eastern and
western ports for export of wheat. These rates are below comparable com-
mercial rates and significantly below U.S. rates. Shipments of Canadian
wheat to the United States are not covered by regulated rates. The CWB is
the shipper of record (in other words, is presumed to pay the bill) and rates
are negotiated between the shipper and the railways. The CWB also pro-
vides some rail cars without charge to the railroads.  The CWB argues that
higher U.S. rail rates are due to a greater railway monopoly concentration
in the United States. However, the ITC saw no difference in Class 1 rail-
road servicing areas or the layout of shortlines between the United States
and Canada. They indicate that when alternative modes of transportation387
included (barge, truck), transportation concentration is lower in the United
States than in Canada.
Finally, the ITC examined effects of Canadian trade and market
regulation on U.S. exports to Canada. They found participants in the U.S.
industry indicated Canadian regulation and laws, as well as the CWB op-
erations, have virtually precluded the marketing of U.S. milling grade wheat
or milled flour to Canadian mills and buyers. Specifically, they identified
varietal registration and end-use certificates as hindering U.S. movements
into Canada. Further, U.S. interests argued that the CWB lowers prices to
Canadian mills to eliminate any possibility of U.S. wheat or flour coming
into Canada. The Wheat Access Facilitation Program which was designed
to allow U.S. wheat access to Canadian rail is no longer in use.
Response by the Special Trade Representative
The U.S. Trade Representative found in favor of the NDWC that
the CWB’s monopolistic system disadvantaged U.S. farmers and under-
mined the integrity of the U.S. trading system (USTR, 2002).  Specifically,
the USTR indicated that “the monopoly CWB has taken sales from U.S.
farmers, and is able to do so because it is insulated from commercial risks,
benefits from subsidies, has a protected domestic market and special privi-
leges, and has  competitive advantages due to its monopoly control over a
guaranteed supply of wheat” (p. 8).
The USTR committed to undertaking several strong initiatives to
address problems with the CWB and specified four steps:
• examine prospects for a dispute settlement case against the CWB
in the WTO;
• work with the NDWC and the U.S. wheat industry to examine
the possibilities of filing U.S. countervailing duty and anti-dump-
ing petitions with the U.S. Dept. of Commerce and the ITC;
• work with the industry to identify specific impediments to U.S.
wheat entering Canada and present these to Canadians;
• provide ongoing effort to vigorously pursue comprehensive and
meaningful reform of  monopolistic STEs within the WTO agri-
culture negotiations.
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The USTR decided not to apply tariff rate quotas at this time as this appli-
cation would violate NAFTA1 and WTO commitments, it could result in
retaliation by Canada, and it would not achieve a longer-term solution to
market distortions caused by the CWB.
Post-Announcement Positioning and Spin-Doctoring
As has become usual in these types of proceedings, all affected
players began spin-doctoring their positions. Following is a synopsis of
what has been said.
Canadian Wheat Board and Other Canadian Interests.  The
CWB released an initial statement indicating that because “the U.S. did not
impose tariffs, we have successfully come through our ninth trade chal-
lenge” (Canadian Wheat Board, 2002; p. 1). Other respondents from Canada
were less optimistic. Art Enns, president of the Western Canadian Wheat
Growers Association indicated that the ruling was a serious threat to west-
ern grain producers. He also indicated that “it was interesting that the main
targets of the investigation are the very same things that the CWB claims as
its strengths” Western Canadian Wheat Growers, p. 1).  Further, the fact
that the focus is only on the practices of the CWB and not on non-board
grain markets, poses a major challenge for western farmers (Western Ca-
nadian Wheat Growers). The president of the (Canadian) Western Barley
Growers Association said, “The CWB’s lack of transparency continues to
be an irritant to our trading partners, which results in continual action against
Canadian farmers. It is time that the CWB and the Canadian government
took action to make participation in the Canadian Wheat Board voluntary,
thereby removing the basis of complaints and trade investigations” (West-
ern Barley Growers Association, p. 1).
U.S. Responses. Responses from U.S. parties included the Sec-
retary of Agriculture Ann Veneman, who supported the decision. She indi-
cated that the investigation “clearly establish that the trade-distorting prac-
tices of the Canadian Wheat Board and the country’s restrictions on im-
ports of wheat are detrimental to the U.S. wheat Industry” (U.S. Wheat
____________________
1  However, since then there has been disagreement on this interpretation of NAFTA.389
Associates, 2002 p. 1). North Dakota’s congressional delegation and Gov-
ernor supported the ruling, yet they had wanted a stronger, more immedi-
ate action. Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND) said, “We should welcome an
opportunity to watch Canada defend the maintenance of a state-run mo-
nopoly in the middle of a free-trade zone” U.S. Wheat Associates, 2002, p.
1).  Other players including the North American Millers Association chair-
man Bernard J. Rothwell III, indicated that “they would look forward to
working with the Administration and growers toward the mutual goal of
eliminating monopoly powers of STEs” (U.S. Wheat Associates, 2002, p.
1).
ASSESSMENT AND DISCUSSION OF POSITIONS IN THE ACTION
Given that this case is ongoing at the time of preparing this paper
and that documents and evidence are not all publicly accessible, the dis-
cussion below is somewhat limited. The ruling is being discounted by some
as just another finding without teeth or solid evidence. It is important that
the findings were affirmative in terms of the allegations and that the CWB
is an arm of the government. These findings differ from previous proceed-
ings. They further illustrate the problems of market integration with dis-
parately organized marketing systems and the resulting difficulties of har-
monization of policies and business practices.
There are several potential paths that could ensue, such as a nego-
tiated agreement, the Trade Representative pursuing remedies inclusive of
the WTO resolution, or simply allowing the issues to pass away with an
undignified death. The claims that NAFTA precludes the imposition of
tariff rate quotas are apparently debatable.  Nevertheless, for our purposes
there are a number of major issues that will no doubt be revisited by econo-
mists, industry and policy analysis.
The major theme or logic to this paper is intended to coincide with
what appears to be the economic logic of the case. There are three points
to that logic:
• there are special rights and privileges enjoyed by the CWB that
are not easily replicated by competitive rivals;
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• these special rights and privileges facilitate greater discretion in
pricing, strategy and positioning than could be enjoyed by com-
mercial rivals;
• these powers result in an unfair competitive advantage relative
to rival suppliers..
 While these comprise a general proposition, it is normally reflected in the
claim that the CWB uses extensive price discrimination in off-shore mar-
keting. The CWB and its proponents are on record many times making this
very point (see on p15).  The notion is that these special rights and privi-
leges facilitate a greater extent of price discrimination than would evolve
in a more competitive marketing system.
These aspects of CWB operation are discussed in the remainder of
this paper.
Special (Exclusive) Rights and Privileges of the CWB
STEs can influence numerous regulations and policies to their ad-
vantage which are much more difficult to implement in a competitive com-
mercial marketing system. Exporter STEs have advantages in sales arrange-
ments, quality regulations, to name two. For these reasons, anything that
undermines the powers of STEs (both import and export) would reduce
disadvantages of competitive rivals because it is extremely difficult (costly
and/or risky) to replicate these advantages within a commercial marketing
system.
The WTO defines an STE as, “Government and non-government
enterprises, including marketing boards, which have been granted exclu-
sive or special rights or privileges, including statutory or constitutional
powers, in the exercise of which they influence through purchases or sales
the level or direction of imports or exports” (U.S. GAO, 1995; p. 16). The
CWB conforms to every definition of an STE and is acknowledged as an
STE through past submissions to the GATT/WTO. Most important are the391
numerous exclusive rights and privileges bestowed on the CWB that are
not available to rivals.2
In the case of the CWB there appear to be numerous rights and
privileges. We include three of greatest importance, as examples only:
• guarantees on initial payments made to producers- -the Govern-
ment of Canada guarantees the CWB (as a selling organization)
for these payments, not individual producers;
• monopoly on procurement; and
• monopoly on selling wheat and barley from Canada to domestic
and off-shore buyers.
In addition to these, the CWB maintains other exclusive rights and privi-
leges, not normally acknowledged, but which could likely be interpreted
similarly:
____________________
2   Canada’s position is that Canada should maintain the ability to choose how to
market its products.  Agriculture Minister Vanclief has  said that, “If other countries
have concerns regarding alleged trade effects of orderly marketing systems, Canada is
prepared to discuss factual concerns.  But Canada will not engage in sterile debates
over alternative marketing philosophies.”  Also, it is Canada’s position that it was
willing to discuss practical trade concerns. However, “Canada will seek to ensure that
any new disciplines proposed to deal with the perceived market power of such enter-
prises apply equally to all entities, public or private, with similar market power” (Ag-
riculture and Agri-Food Canada 1999).
The CWB’s stance is to reinforce STEs as legitimate commercial enterprises.
They have been advocates for further reductions in support programs, and “future
agreements must continue to ensure that Canada has the right to establish its own
approach to marketing, including the CWB.” (CWB, July 1999). In the case of the
Australian Wheat Board, Chairman Trevor Flugge said, “We also expect that the issue
of state trading enterprises will be considered during the course of negotiations. The
issue should not be STEs per se, but rather whether the entity concerned contravenes
any established world trade rules. In light of this, we believe each STE should be
examined on a case by case basis and we would strongly refute the claims made by the
United State in relation to so-called trade distorting practices of AWB Limited as an
STE” (Australian Wheat Board, May 31, 1999).
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• rail car ownership by governments and allocation authority for CWB
grains;3
• special legislated rates on rail grains (i.e. for grains grown in west-
ern Canada there are separate regulations);4and
• non-reporting of prices (facilitating non-transparency).5
While there are many issues related to the integration of STE types of
functions into more commercially competitive industries, there are three areas
of particular importance in
grain trading which warrant special attention: the competitive effects of guar-
anteed initial payments and procurement monopoly, price discrimination and
price transparency.
Guaranteed Initial Payments
One of the important features of some STEs is the guarantee by gov-
ernment of initial payments paid to producers. This is a fundamental tool of
the CWB. This mechanism, along with the purchasing monopoly provides
advantages to these selling organizations. While there are numerous impacts
of these mechanisms, two are particularly apparent in a reasonably competi-
tive market place. One impact is that the initial payment is typically a sharp
discount relative to market prices. In recent years, the spread between initials
and market price appears to have widened and does not accurately reflect
____________________
3  Rail car allocation authority is granted to the CWB for specified movements and
provides several benefits, including making adjustments to grain transportation plans,
ensuring farmer access,  fostering (foisting) competition among handlers via tendering
systems, etc.
4  In 1996 the Canada Transportation Act replaced the National Transportation Act
with competitive provisions. Concurrently, it created Div VI rates with  the maximum
rates on grains, which by now were based on 1992 frozen costs, indexed upward. These
were for statutory movements defined as grain and grain products with origins in the
Prairies, to specific export ports. Exclusions were made for grains not grown in the
Prairies (e.g. the United States) and grains exported to the United States. This resulted
in two regimes of rates—one subject to normal regulatory processes and the other for
statutory grain movements. The latter regime of rates was more favorable and has since
been assigned a revenue cap.
5  Elsewhere in Canada and the United States, government entities are active in price
reporting for purposes of facilitating more symmetric information among rivals.393
price differentials associated with quality differences. For an exporter STE the
initial represents an element of marginal cost for transactions, which could be
argued to be the lower bound of marginal cost. This situation contrasts to a
private-firm rival for whom a major component of the marginal cost of selling
is the current market value. The effect of this differential provides greater
pricing flexibility to the extent it can be pursued by the STE.
The other impact of these mechanisms in competitive selling is that it
provides a greater ability for making fixed price deferred delivery contracts,
an important issue in competition among selling organizations and firms. Wil-
son et al. (1999) first described this relationship. In concept, large export firms
could provide similar terms but they would be more costly to execute.  Wilson
et al. indicated that the policy regime in Canada (identity preservation along
with a procurement monopoly) is fundamentally similar to the Canadian gov-
ernment providing a free put option to the CWB. Using typical values at the
time of their analysis, the value of the free put option was about 8 cents per
bushel.
This interpretation is important. If a competitive firm were to provide
similar sales terms (i.e. fixed price for distant deferred delivery), that firm
would have to assume a position of long-cash/long option (put). Of course,
that position presumes there are perfectly efficient futures and options mar-
kets for these grains and grades, which of course is not the case even though
it is commonly alleged. Hedging costs (i.e. execution costs) and transaction
costs are non-zero, basis risks would still be assumed by the seller, and for
most of the grains and grain types in questions, futures and options do not
exist. Thus, these risks are not easily hedgeable, nor cost-free to assume.
These claims have been challenged by several authors. Veeman et al.
(1999) argue that risks in procurement costs can be hedged and costs for
search of supplies can be offset by contracting between producers and
traders. They indicate that since contracting for supplies is not a wide-
spread practice in the United States, traders do not face significant prob-
lems of grain acquisition. Further, they argue that because initial prices are
known, U.S. traders know the CWB’s acquisition cost whereas, the CWB
does not know what those prices are for U.S. firms. Finally, they argue that
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the practice of initial pricing results in less flexibility in the procurement
pricing for the CWB.
Schmitz, Furtan and Baylis (1999, p. 31) indicate that government
guaranteed initial prices are a soft-price discrimination policy that “may”
violate WTO rules when payments are made because taxpayer revenue is
transferred directly to producers. This is one of the core arguments of the
ITC which indicates there is a tendency for the CWB to have greater pric-
ing flexibility and advantages in deferred transactions versus competitive
rivals.
Price Discrimination
Price discrimination is defined as “the same commodity
being sold to different customers for different prices” (Phlips 1985, p. 5).
Price discrimination may also occur when or if different quality products
are sold to different customers for the same price, or if terms of trade are
not reflected in prices. In economic terms, price discrimination is said to
exist if:
      Pi / MCi … Pj / MCj
where  P is price, MC is marginal cost and i and j represent two different
customers.
Price discrimination is generally considered an acceptable trade
practice and in some cases, a desirable business practice, subject to limits
(Phlips)   It is a very common practice, particularly among industries with
high fixed costs but requires market power to effectuate and ability to
separate markets. Examples abound including pricing by railroads, air-
lines, universities, movie theaters, etc. Generally, price discrimination is
optimal for any selling organization if it has some monopoly power, if
there are differences in demand elasticities among different customer
groups, and/or if there are cost differences in serving different customers.
Because of its appeal, and irrespective of its innocuous effects, it is fre-
quently difficult to detect (according to the definition above). It is virtually
impossible to prevent or to regulate selling firms/organizations from prac-
ticing price discrimination. This is generally true in domestic economies,395
and no doubt would be excessively difficult or impossible in international
trade. Indeed, that is what confronted investigators and consultants in this
case.
There is much debate in this action about whether price discrimi-
nation occurs or not, how extensive is it, is it good or bad, and its impact
prospectively on U.S. prices. However, both parties probably missed the
important points. These arguments get bogged down in terms of market
definition, class substitutability, elasticities and the inevitable problem of
market
elasticities for products versus purchase probabilities for individual sup-
pliers,  all of which are elusive considerations without transaction prices.
Despite these problems, there are numerous observations by U.S. Wheat
Associates that suggest that the CWB (and the Australian Wheat Board)
actively pursue discriminatory pricing practices (USTR 2002). Some of
their examples would technically conform to the definitions of price dis-
crimination as above. Irrespective of these anecdotal observations, it is
common knowledge that price discrimination is a commonly practiced
and the CWB admits an advantage they enjoy is the ability “to price differ-
entially,” particularly among importing countries and in some cases be-
tween companies in the same markets.
Kraft et al. (1996) purport to illustrate that the CWB has been able
to price discriminate and as such to increase the revenue paid to their pro-
ducers. Wilson and Dahl however qualify some of these observations. Many
of the blatant examples of price discrimination generally coincided with
the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) period in the United States. The
EEP provided greater incentives for STEs to exploit price discriminating
strategies- -the EEP simply exacerbated the demand heterogeneity con-
fronting STE sellers and, itself, separated some markets. It is likely that
price discrimination has been practiced for many years prior to and since
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EEP, but during the period in which EEP was active, its use was likely
facilitated.6
The WTO has specific provisions about price discrimination. STE’s
are subject to the WTO constraints that export subsidies do not exceed the
allowable subsidies in the WTO Schedules, and a general constraint that
they must behave commercially. Therefore, STEs can price discriminate as
long as it is for “commercial” (as opposed to subsidization) reasons. Tar-
geted price discrimination is allowed for STEs only as long as the amount
of subsidy is less than the limits established in their respective country’s
WTO commitments.
For purposes of this action there are three important issues in rela-
tion to price discrimination:
• some of the claims and evidence are that the CWB offers wheat
at a fixed differential relative to U.S. offers in specific markets.
This belief irritates many U.S. parties. However, this does not
necessarily imply price discrimination (as defined above), nor is
it a case of non-transparency (as discussed below). It may sim-
ply be more symptomatic of brutal competition (i.e. reducing
prices for market entry).
• under the definition provided above, it is virtually impossible to
make credible claims about price discrimination without concur-
rent and detailed information about marginal costs inclusive of
handling, shipping, as well as price adjustments for different
grades, classes and specifications; notwithstanding the interpre-
tation of what marginal cost means to the CWB.
____________________
6  Goodwin and Smith (1995) indicate that price discrimination is analogous to an
implicit subsidy on exports if the seller is able to limit imports into the higher priced
markets. Skully (1992) indicates that the CCC uses its export policies (the combina-
tion of EEP, PL480 and credit guarantees) to price discriminate. Paddock (1998) indi-
cates that while the practice of price discrimination by STEs is a concern, he argues
that alleged premiums could be extracted from any market with an inelastic demand
without arbitrage opportunities. In contrast to Paddock, who suggested that price
discrimination may be limited, Veeman et al. (1999) indicate that it was a common
practice among private trading organizations and would continue to be even without
STEs.397
• certainly, the claims of over-delivering quality (if overt, which is
questionable), would qualify as price discrimination, as would
providing preferred terms for deferred shipments.
Taken together, the effect of several of the marketing policies in Canada
(notably pooled pricing commensurate with lower initial prices, rail rate
differentials, and others) is to make a larger component of costs as fixed,
thereby lowering the relevant marginal cost of marketing. The effect of
this is to facilitate a greater latitude in pricing than would be the case if the
marginal cost represented a larger share of the total cost. Hence, these
marketing policies likely have the impact of facilitating price discrimina-
tion to a greater extent than otherwise would be the case.
Price Transparency
There is a range of definitions for price transparency. Klassen indi-
cates that a lack of price transparency is “a lack of full price disclosure”
(Sosland, 1994 p. 29). Furtan describes it as “the extent that details of
transactions made by purchasing or selling agents are available to the pub-
lic” (Furtan, p. 4). Glickman defines it as “people knowing the market
prices and volumes, and producers know on a fairly instantaneous basis
what is happening and who’s getting what for what dollars” Wilson, 1999
(p. 4).  Wilson et al. define it as firms in bidding competition having sym-
metric information about each other, thus no bidders have a strategic ad-
vantage. If information is asymmetric, then bidders with superior informa-
tion would have a strategic advantage (Wilson et al.).
Many of the aspects of the U.S. marketing system are highly trans-
parent to competitors. These include public reporting of prices, export ten-
ders, sales and inspections (weekly), and public tariffs for transportation
and handling. In addition, results of all sales made under export assistance
including PL480 and EEP are publicly reported. These mechanisms do not
have counterparts (e.g., price reporting, reporting or export sales/shipments
in a timely manner)  in either Canada or Australia.
Factors affecting price transparency include a lack of futures mar-
kets and/or highly decentralized cash markets that may be subject to large
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premiums and discounts for quality and the cessation of EEP activity has
reduced the transparency of U.S. firms. Further, there are aspects of the
Canadian marketing systems that both exacerbate and mitigate the trans-
parency problem. These include price pooling, disclosure of daily CWB
offers in the North American market, and the initial payment guarantee.
Schmitz et al. (1999) summarize earlier works on transparency, and argue
that price transparency was not trade distorting. They argue that if the
CWB were replaced by multinationals, transparency would not increase.
They argue that, in the world grain market, price discovery occurs in U.S.
futures markets that are linked to cash markets throughout the world and
these relationships are followed and known by both STEs and traders. As
such, the bidding/asking prices of multinationals are as confidential as the
CWB’s offer prices.
Wilson et al. (1999) examined transparency and bidding competi-
tion in the international wheat trade. Stylized cases were developed to es-
timate the advantage of less transparent players in bidding games. Results
indicate that as the number of bidders increase, informational advantages
of less transparent bidders decline with most of advantages being lost when
there are six or more bidders. Further, firms that both act as agents in some
auctions and compete with STEs in others can defeat informational advan-
tages of STEs. Finally, in their stylized game, the value of the likely infor-
mational advantages of STEs were estimated to be within the range one to
two dollars per metric ton.
There is a fundamental difference between price transparency and
transparency of operations. The CWB (as described by Paddock) alleges
they are transparent due to the fact that they publish an annual report.
However, this does not negate the issues associated with non-transparency
in transactions.  The annual report simply is an average of all  pooled
transactions over the crop year, available a year after the fact, and is virtu-
ally meaningless in mitigating the adverse impacts of transparency. Fur-
ther, it is important now that the vast majority of the international grain
traders have much greater public transparency than their predecessors of
the 1970s.  As examples, the largest exporters today include Cargill which
has to report their financial performance routinely due to having an Em-399
ployee Stock Option Program (ESOP); ConAgra and ADM, among others,
which are publicly held stock companies and report their financials rou-
tinely; and the larger co-operatives which also report to the public and
their shareholders.  Thus, notwithstanding the irrelevancy of any of these
to the real issues of price transparency, the CWB is no more or less trans-
parent than other exporting firms in their public reporting of financial re-
turns and operations.
Traditionally, marketing boards and STEs have not released infor-
mation on export sales.  As such, it is difficult to monitor transactions. This
matter is further complicated by compliance issues with notification. The
current questionnaire for STE notification to the WTO does not require
information that would allow for verification of circumvention of commit-
ments. That would require information on volumes of individual transac-
tions, their level of subsidies and sales prices (Incgo and Ng, 1998). Nev-
ertheless, under current WTO rules, countries are required to report their
STEs. In the past, few countries reported them. For those that have re-
ported their STEs, reports have been sporadic and the amount of informa-
tion reported has been limited. This occurred due to STEs largely trading
agricultural goods which were generally not controlled by trade rules. Po-
tential changes in WTO rules have been advanced in prior negotiations to
increase transparency. However, those countries with STEs have argued
that transparency issues are covered in the notification system.
The issue of lack of transparency is highlighted in the ITC case.
However, it is not clear whether the concern is lack of price transparency
(or similarly, transparency about export sales, credit terms or other terms
of transactions), or transparency of operations. Irrespective,  it is important
that greater transparency about prices is desirable. Certainly, individual
rivals will strive very hard to be non-transparent to gain some asymmetric
advantages. Nevertheless,  hallmarks of market efficiency and effective
economic policy is that greater transparency is desirable, which requires
price and export sales reporting. Given the non-synchronous treatment of
this issue regarding CWB marketing versus marketing elsewhere in Canada
and throughout the United States, there is no doubt that this will be a con-
tinual challenge to reconcile.
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FUTURE CHALLENGING ISSUES
The affirmative findings of the ITC on the NDWC claims regard-
ing the CWB require that the Trade Representative seek resolution. How
that resolution will ensue and its likely alternatives are not at all clear. It is
not clear that the Government of Canada has left any room for a negotiated
solution. And, it is not clear if the will of the current U.S. administration is
to push for a resolution with any great zeal. Each party would likely prefer
that the problem would just go away, as opposed to reaching, or forcing, a
mutually acceptable resolution to the problem.
In light of these proceedings, policy analysts will have to deal with
several issues in the coming years. Four of these are mentioned briefly.
First is the issue of price discrimination and the extent that marketing poli-
cies (due to special rights and privileges) are the enabling mechanism is
important. The WTO does not preclude price discrimination, probably due
to the difficulty of monitoring, measuring and interpreting the results. Nev-
ertheless, extensive price discrimination is likely not a favorable outcome
for competition in the trading and vertically aligned industries.
Second, is the extent that non-transparency of prices affects rival’s
behavior and conduct in an industry.  Third,   operationally, NAFTA has
relied on a loosely defined concept of “acquisition cost” to facilitate inter-
preting the prospect of anti-competitive behavior within North America.
This should almost certainly be revisited looking for a more defendable
definition.
Finally,  independent of the specific claims in this action, some of
the results are again a reminder of difficulties of integrating competitive
rivals with entities subject to lesser competitive pressures, as well as incon-
sistent policy mechanisms. A few of these differences would include: 1)
policies in the United States reducing acres (e.g. Conservation Reserve
Program) in an open border market and income subsidies; 2)  U.S. policies
favoring storing (i.e. non-selling) versus Canadian pooling mechanisms
favoring selling within a marketing year; 3) the salesmanship for Canadian
grains in an environment where there has been reduced marketing efforts401
by multinational trading firms; and 4)   recent consolidations in Canadian
grain marketing has likely allowed even more microscopic rights and privi-
leges to be exploited by the CWB.  These issues are all examples of the
fodder for research and probably more trade actions in the coming years.
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